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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a 
real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue 
in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark's «mathematical multiverse» are 
too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But 
the «mathematical multiverse» is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have 
performed a number of experiments with cellular automata of complex behavior, which can 
be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what 
happens in some automata (in particular Conway’s «Game of Life») and the real world is 
very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we 
should expect to inhabit −in the context of the multiverse− a world in which at least some 
of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the 
probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. 
In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the 
hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for 
the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. A slightly reduced version of this paper 
has been published in the Journal for General Philosophy of Science, Springer, March 2013, 
DOI: 10.1007/s10838-013-9215-7. 
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Introduction  
The hypothesis that the universe where we live represents, not the whole physical 
reality, but a particular domain inside a much larger reality which includes many other 
universes, started to be considered a cosmological possibility in the last decade of the 
previous century. Although a similar idea was offered in the fifties as a solution to the 
quantum measurement problem (Everett's «multiple worlds» interpretation), that problem 
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is completely different from those tackled by the cosmologists who uphold the multiverse 
hypothesis. Therefore, here we will not consider Everett's approach and its subsequent 
formulations. 
The confluence of three different lines of research explains why a hypothesis as 
speculative and risky as the multiverse has been taken seriously in the latest years. These 
lines are the following: 
(1) Inflationary cosmology. 
(2)  Different attempts to build a quantum gravity theory. 
(3) Research on the effect that a small modification in the structure of physical 
laws would have on the development of complex beings and life as we 
know it. 
The multiverse question arises in the context of inflationary cosmology. The cosmic 
inflation hypothesis was proposed initially by Alan Guth in 1981. Guth was trying to 
explain two phenomena which the standard cosmological model could not explain: (1) the 
homogeneity of those regions in the universe which had never been able to interact [the so-
called horizon problem] and (2) the fact that the universe seems to be approximately flat, 
which entails that, in the beginning of the expansion, the density parameter of the universe 
must have had a value extremely near to the critic density [the so-called flatness problem]. 
Guth proposed that the universe experienced a process of exponential expansion 
between 
3710−  and 
3510−  seconds after the Big Bang. According to Guth's initial proposal, 
the reason for this would be given by the value of Higgs's field Φ  as deduced from a 
certain version of the grand unifying theory. The potential of this field )(ΦV  would act at 
that time as a cosmological constant, accelerating enormously the expansion of the 
universe. At the end of this stretch of time, inflation would be replaced by an expansion 
similar to that described by the standard model, which would still be valid, except for its 
application to the first stages of the universe. 
The inflationary scenario offers an answer to the two mentioned questions. The 
horizon problem is solved because what today makes our observable universe comes from 
a very small region with mutual interactions before the exponential expansive phase. And 
the flatness problem is solved because the universe, as a consequence of the inflation, has 
reached such dimensions that it appears to be practically flat, even although it may still 
possess some curvature. 
But it so happens that the initial Guth theory, together with several other proposals 
made to support inflation, have been proved unfeasible, because they do not fit some of 
the known cosmological parameters; because they predict an universe less homogeneous 
than what can be observed; because they display internal inconsistencies; and so forth. 
However, this hypothesis is still appealing for cosmologists, thus new, ever more refined 
inflationary scenarios have been developed. Currently, the model which appears to present 
less problems − developed mainly by Andrei Linde, Alex Vilenkin and co-workers− 
suggests that the cosmic inflationary process never ends, that the universe expands 
exponentially forever, while here and there different domains are being formed, such as our 
observable universe, which are regions of a much larger physical reality: regions where the 
potential pushing the inflation has reached a minimum value, and where therefore the 
exponential growth of the cosmos has stopped. As these regions are causally disconnected 
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from one another, it seems that, if we accept the inflationary hypothesis, we should also 
accept the existence of the multiverse. 
Another independent line of research which leads to the idea of the multiverse is 
the search for a quantum gravity theory. It will suffice to say, briefly, that we have at 
present mainly two different approaches towards this theory: the superstring hypothesis, 
and the quantum loop theory, both of which end up in the idea of the multiverse. In the 
case of superstrings, the problem is that, instead of there being a single physical structure 
complying with the requirements considered fundamental for this frame, there are about 
50010  (or as some say, 
100010 ) possible structures. This is a regrettable situation. And the 
solution proposed by Susskind and others is that physical reality carries out all those 
possibilities. So we would live in a multiverse where all the possible universes within the 
frame of string theory are also real universes. 
As to the quantum loop hypothesis, it so happens that the first tentative 
cosmological models being developed inside this frame −Bojowald models− suggest that 
our universe suffered a process of collapse previous to the Big Bang described by the 
standard cosmology. This has reinforced Smolin's conjecture that this universe could have 
resulted from a gravitational collapse inside a larger physical reality. In other words, one 
universe may give origin to another, inside one of its black holes. Once again, the 
multiverse scenario. 
Finally, the multiverse hypothesis has been proposed as a solution to the problem 
of the fine tuning of physical constants and laws. This problem can be stated thus: since 
the eighties, we have a detailed standard model, both in cosmology and in particle physics. 
This makes it possible to analyze, theoretically and through computer simulations, 
questions such as the consequences for the cosmos of slight changes in some of the 
parameters demanded by these models. The result of these researches has been the 
discovery that a certain number of parameters, both in the standard cosmological model, as 
in the standard particle physics model, give the impression of being finely tuned, in the 
sense that, if they had had values minimally different from those they actually have, life in 
the cosmos −and in many cases every complex structure− would have been physically 
impossible. 
Some authors interpret this fact as an inkling that our universe is nothing but a 
single domain in a much larger reality, in such a way that we inhabit just that domain of 
reality where the appropriate conditions for the existence of life as we know it prevail. 
The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis 
provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. To 
reach this goal, the paper is divided in the following sections: 
In the first section, we will consider some of the examples of fine tuning discussed 
in the latest years, so as not to lose sight of what we want to explain with the help of the 
multiverse. In other words, what is the fine tuning of the universe. 
In the second section we will discuss the question of which version of the 
multiverse should be assumed to eliminate fully the problem of the fine tuning of the 
universe. We shall show that only the «mathematical multiverse» proposed by Max 
Tegmark prevents the question of fine tuning to appear again in the multiverse context. 
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In the third section we will suggest a way to test that hypothesis. We shall select 
cellular automata as examples of possible universes where we can test some of the 
«predictions» offered by Tegmark as regards the multiverse hypothesis. 
In the fourth section we will detail the experiments we have performed with cellular 
automata with respect to Tegmark's «predictions». They try to show how the behavior of 
cellular automata is affected by changes in their rules −the equivalent to the laws of nature 
in a universe− in a relation to their ability to develop complex structures. 
In the fifth section we will state the consequences of our study regarding the 
question of whether the multiverse hypothesis can explain the fine tuning of our universe. 
Our provisional answer is on the negative: if we accept the multiverse as the explanation of 
the fine tuning of universe, we should expect that the laws of this universe would be less 
simple as they are. In particular, it seems that we could expect that at least some of the laws 
and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. 
1. The fact of the fine tuning of the universe 
All along the last century, especially in its last decades, a surprising fact about the 
universe where we live has been discovered: the fact that its architecture possesses very 
peculiar properties, in the sense that very slight changes in the combination of physical laws 
and constants of nature would have the consequence that the cosmos would become a 
physical system hostile to the development of life. We give the name «fine tuning» of the 
universe to the fact that nature behaves following one of the (at least apparently) scarce 
hospitable combinations of laws and constants. In order not to leave this exposition in a 
too abstract plane, we shall mention a few concrete examples of this tuning. These 
examples have been taken from Robin Collins paper The evidence of fine tuning, one of 
the clearest presentations of the matter.  
(a) The cosmological constant: 
«The smallness of the cosmological constant is widely regarded as the single 
greatest problem confronting current physics and cosmology. [...] Apart from 
some sort of extraordinary precise fine-tuning or new physical principle, 
today’s theories of fundamental physics and cosmology lead one to expect [...] 
an extraordinary large effective cosmological constant, one so large that it 
would, if positive, cause space to expand at such an enormous rate that almost 
every object in the Universe would fly apart, and would, if negative, cause the 
Universe to collapse almost instantaneously back in on itself. This would 
clearly make the evolution of intelligent life impossible. 
What makes it so difficult to avoid postulating some sort of highly precise fine-
tuning of the cosmological constant is that almost every type of field in current 
physics [...] contributes to the vacuum energy. [...] [When] physicists make 
estimates of the contribution to the vacuum energy from these fields, they get 
values of the energy density anywhere from higher 
5310  to 
12010 than its 
maximum life-permitting value»3. 
(b) The strong and the electromagnetic forces: 
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«A 50 percent decrease in the strength of the strong force, for instance, would 
undercut the stability of all elements essential for carbon-based life, with a 
slightly larger decrease eliminating all elements except hydrogen»4 
«[Around] a fourteen-fold increase in the electromagnetic force would have the 
same effect on the stability of elements as a 50 percent decrease in the strong 
force»5. 
(c) Carbon production in stars: 
«[A] change of more than 0.5% in the strength of the strong interaction or 
more than 4% in the strength of the Coulomb [electromagnetic] force would 
destroy either nearly all C or all O in every star. This implies that irrespective 
of stellar evolution the contribution of each star to the abundance of C or O in 
the ISM [interstellar medium] would be negligible. Therefore, for the above 
cases the creation of carbon-based life in our universe would be strongly 
disfavored»6 
(d) The proton/neutron mass difference: 
«The neutron is slightly heavier than the proton by about 1.293 MeV. If the 
mass of neutron were increased by another 1.4 MeV −that is, by one part in 
700 of its actual mass of about 938 MeV− then one of the keys steps by which 
stars burn their hydrogen to helium could not occur [...]: 
p+p→deuteron+positron+electron neutrino+0.42 MeV 
[...] On the other hand, a small decrease on the neutron mass of around 0.5 to 
0.7 MeV would result in nearly equal numbers of protons and neutrons in the 
early stages of the Big Bang [...] resulting in an almost all-helium universe»7 
Accepting thus that there is a delicate tuning of the laws and physical constants, 
without which the development of complex chemical structures would not have been 
possible, especially life (and most especially intelligent life, whose appearance requires 
doubtlessly that favorable conditions are maintained much longer than what is required by 
one-cellular life), the question is how to interpret this fact. What does this fine tuning tell 
us about the physical reality? Is it a meaningful datum, or mere chance? And if the former, 
what does it entail? What is it pointing at?  
In the latest years, some authors suggest that fine tuning is an inkling that the 
cosmos is much wider than we assumed and is made of domains with different 
combinations of laws and constants, in which case we must inhabit one of those oasis 
favorable to life in the middle of a mostly inhospitable physical whole. This is equivalent to 
propose the multiverse as the explanation of the fine tuning observed in the cosmos. 
Now then, under which conditions can the multiverse really explain the fine tuning 
of our universe? We will tackle this question in the next section. 
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2. Types of multiverse and their adequacy to explain the fine tuning 
In the specialized literature there are several types of entities called «multiverse». 
The main ones are the following: 
 
1. On the first place, we find authors who give the name of multiverse to the infinite 
universe, following this reasoning: the observable universe, the environment which 
includes all the objects whose light has reached us since the Big Bang8 to our time, has 
now a radius of about 26104 ⋅  meter; the volume of the corresponding sphere is called 
«the Hubble volume». It is thus a partial domain inside the infinite universe. Everything 
we could examine, whatever the power of our telescopes, is included inside our Hubble 
volume. If there is something beyond, we don't know, and it can never affect us 
causally. In fact, for us, its existence does not matter. Under a purely empiricist 
criterion (which we are far from enforcing) we could say that the assertion that there is 
something beyond the Hubble volume is not even scientific. 
Some authors suggest that we should consider every sphere of the same size as our 
observable universe as a full-fledged universe. Since an infinite universe would contain 
infinitely many spheres of this kind, they give it the name of multiverse. 
Actually this terminology is a rather unfortunate choice, because it makes us take as a 
set of different entities what really makes a single physical system ―the open universe― 
endowed with a high degree of unity, which cannot be decomposed in «sphere-
universes» or any other cosmological sub-unities, except in an arbitrary way. 
2. The second type of multiverse derives from physical hypotheses which have not 
reached an empiric support that would allow them to become standard theories, but a 
certain number of specialists trust that they are adequate to reality, and try to develop 
them and provide the empiric support they still lack. In this group we may rank the 
multiverse derived from the eternal inflation scenario proposed by Linde and Villenkin; 
the multiverse containing the so-called «cosmic landscape», i.e. all the possible 
realizations of superstring theory; the scenario defended by Smolin of multiple 
universes generated in black holes; and similar conjectures. In this case, the term 
multiverse is used to represent something completely new ―as against the infinite 
universe.― In all these scenarios, the various domains differ structurally from one 
another. This means that the laws of physics can be partially different in each domain, 
although all of them obey a common general physical structure. On the other hand, 
each of the cosmic domains is completely ―or almost completely― causally 
disconnected from the others. Therefore each can be considered as an authentic 
«universe island» which would continue its evolution according to its own dynamics 
although the remainder of the universe disappeared in an immense cosmic cataclysm. 
3. Finally, since a few years ago, the possible existence of a multiverse incomparably larger 
than the former is being discussed. This idea, proposed by the physicist Max Tegmark, 
consists in assuming that: 
                                                 
8 Actually we can only receive the light emitted after what is usually called the «surface of final dispersion», 
the instant when radiation uncoupled from matter. This happened about 100,000 years after the Big Bang. 
But these details are not important here. After all, 100,000 years are not much... at the cosmological scale. 
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«[...] mathematical existence and physical existence are equivalent, so that all 
mathematical structures exist physically as well»9. 
Tegmark's suggestion results in the conception of a multiverse where every possible 
combination of laws and natural constants occurs in fact in one or another domain of 
reality. In the cosmic scenario proposed by Tegmark, there are no privileged mathematical 
structures, nor privileged initial or boundary conditions, nor physical constants of any type 
whose values are restricted to such and such concrete value. Every consistent mathematical 
structure is realized. (Or, more precisely, every consistent mathematical structure is a 
physical universe). The only reason behind the peculiarities of the universe we observe is 
anthropic: we just observe the world which is consistent with our own existence. 
In fact, this third type of multiverse is the only one that provides us with an 
scenario which does not leave room to the question about the actual values of the physical 
constants, nor to the question of why the physical laws are what they are. That is, only a 
multiverse which realizes all the consistent mathematical structures seems a candidate with 
possibilities to solve the question of the fine tuning of the universe, for in the other 
multiverses this question appears again, this time in the multiverse frame. 
To see that this is so, let us look at a concrete example: the cosmic landscape of 
string theory may contain about 101000 structurally different universes, but they share 
common features, such as this: all of them possess physical laws of the quantum type. 
None of these universes may be ruled, for instance, by a Newtonian physics structure. This 
is an interesting detail, as the huge importance of quantum effects for the appearance of 
the chemical structures basic for life makes us suspect that, if the multiverse contained only 
worlds based on variations of classical physics, not one of them would be apt for the 
existence of life. Therefore, whatever the enormous size of the superstring cosmic 
landscape, it is still a biophile scenario which suggests design, in contrast with the 
unrealized possibilities of completely sterile multiverses. 
Most of the multiverse models proposed up to now −those of Linde, Vilenkin, 
Susskind, Smolin, etc.− are subject to this problem: they only realize a too small number of 
all the possible physical structures. Therefore, the fact that one of them is apt for life is still 
surprising. 
Let us underline this: to notice the limitation of these multiverses, at first sight so 
vast, what we must do is look at them from the −incomparably larger− perspective of all 
the mathematical structures which could be considered as the basis for the laws of a 
possible universe. In other words: in principle, if we start from the set of logically possible 
universes, it is possible to define in them a great variety of subsets (which would be the 
possible multiverses), as well as a great variety of mechanisms generating such subsets10. 
And each of these subsets of universes, together with each of their possible generating 
mechanisms, will possess certain features, more or less favorable for the development of 
complex structures, living beings, intelligent observers, or any other type of realities. What 
eventually takes us again to a situation of fine tuning which should be explained. In the 
words of Stoeger:  
                                                 
9 TEGMARK (2004) 483. 
10 Consult about this, for instance, the thoughts by Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger about the set of physically 
possible universes and the different kinds of subsets (multiverses) definable in it. These thoughts can be 
found in the following papers: ELLIS – KIRCHNER – STOEGER (2003), and STOEGER – ELLIS – KIRCHNER 
(2004). 
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«If we do have good evidence, and an adequately specific model for, the 
multiverse to which our own universe belongs, thus providing some 
explanation for its bio-friendly characteristics, this would not be a complete 
−let alone an ultimate− explanation. We would still require an explanation for 
the existence and bio-friendly character of the multiverse itself (bearing in 
mind that there is no unique prescription for it) and for the process through 
which it emerged [...]»11. 
For this reason, many authors have come to the conclusion that the postulate of a 
kind of multiverse just poses the problem of design in a new plane. In the words of Davies: 
«Multiverses merely shift the problem up one level»12. A conclusion which is based on the 
following reasoning: 
«Each law of laws specifies a different version of the multiverse, and not all 
multiverses are bound to contain at least one biophilic universe. In fact [...] 
most multiverses would not contain even one component universe in which all 
the parameter values were suitable for life. To see this, note that each 
parameter will have a small range of values −envisage it as a highlighted 
segment on a line− consistent with biology. Only in universes where all the 
relevant highlighted segments intersect in a single patch (i.e. all biophilic values 
are instantiated together) will biology be possible. If the several parameters 
vary independently between universes, each according to some rule, then for 
most sets of rules the highlighted segments will not concur»13. 
How can this be solved? In principle, it seems that the only solution is the 
mathematical multiverse proposed by Tegmark. Evidently, the mathematical multiverse is 
quite different from the others. In this multiverse there are no mathematical structures (or 
no particular values of constants) privileged, thus there remains no room for design and 
choice (or chance). In other words, starting from the physical existence of all mathematical 
consistent structures, the objections placed (among others) by Davies and Stoeger do not 
apply. 
Let us thus look at the next question: Is the mathematical multiverse a viable 
explanation of the fine tuning of the laws and natural constants of our universe? Can we do 
something to test this scenario? Or is this just an unwarranted speculation? We will tackle 
this in the next section. 
3. Predictions from the mathematical multiverse hypothesis. Cellular 
automata as a way to test them 
It does not seem easy to derive, from the hypothesis of the mathematical multiverse 
(or actually from any other variant of the multiverse hypothesis) concrete predictions 
relative to our world. However, something can be done. If we start from the hypothesis 
that we live in a typical universe in the set of all the universes consistent with our existence 
−the so-called «mediocrity principle», which can be vindicated by means of statistical 
arguments− there are at least three assertions (proposed by Tegmark) which should take 
place. The first two can be formulated as follows: 
                                                 
11 STOEGER (2007) 455. 
12 DAVIES (2007) 497. 
13 Ibídem. 
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«―Prediction 1: The mathematical structure describing our world is the most 
general among those consistent with our observations. 
―Prediction 2: Our observations are the most general consistent with our 
existence.»14 
The third statement is the following: 
 «Our future observations are the most general among those consistent with 
our past observations.»15 
As in the case of the second prediction, what is being stated here is the fact that the 
behavior of the universe we observe cannot be more specific than what is strictly necessary 
to guarantee our existence. What will happen in the future should be determined only, and 
in the most general way, −consistent with the anthropic condition− by what has been 
observed in the past. Thus we should not expect that nature exhibits unnecessary 
regularities along time. In this way, we can consider this third prediction a particular case of 
the second. 
The problem, anyway, is that these assertions are so general that it is not easy to see 
how they could be refuted by means of concrete observations about the structure of our 
world. 
In the ideal case, a scientist doing research in this area should be able to study 
several universes with laws similar to ours (to a certain extent), so as to test the result of 
altering in some way the laws of nature. Do we really observe the most general laws 
consistent with our existence? Are our future observations the most general among all 
those consistent with our past observations? For instance, up to now everything seems to 
point to the fact that neither the laws nor the constants of nature in our universe change 
with time. Does this mean that, if they exhibited a minimal variability, they would be 
unable to generate structures such as us? 
In the ideal case, the scientist would choose a sample of universes, some identical 
to ours, some with a certain variability of the laws of nature (or other variation providing 
those laws with a more general formulation than ours); and would find whether intelligent 
life becomes impossible in those universes. If this is not the case, we would be living in an 
universe with specially simple laws among those universe compatible with life as ours, and 
predictions 2 and 3 in Tegmark's proposal would be falsified. 
Well, it is evident that we do not have a sample of universes to perform such a 
study. But perhaps we can reach the same goal in an indirect way, by studying a type of 
mathematical structures that can exist in multiple variations, and which generate worlds −at 
least in the context of the mathematical universe, where every consistent mathematical 
structure must be considered a world− where, depending on the rules and the initial or 
boundary conditions selected, complex entities may or may not appear and stay living. 
Cellular automata make an interesting case of this type of mathematical structures. 
They consist of the following components: (1) a discrete space of dimension Zn ∈  divided 
in cells; (2) a finite set of possible states for each cell; (3) a certain number (the same for all 
cells) of neighboring cells; and (4) a transition rule that fixes the next state of each cell as a 
                                                 
14 TEGMARK (1998) 4. 
15 TEGMARK (2007) 120. 
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function of its current state and the states of its neighboring cells. Time is considered a set 
of discrete instants, i.e. Zt ∈ . 
Cellular automata are very useful for the question we are trying to research. First, 
because it provides us with models of «universes» regulated by rules quite easy to describe. 
And second −this is the main point− because, depending on the chosen transition rules 
−and the boundary conditions− the resulting behavior is a space where all the cells finally 
take the same value; or a periodic behavior emerges; or a chaotic (completely irregular) 
behavior; or a complex behavior: a situation containing particular configurations with 
special properties, which evolve and act in a way that sometimes strongly reminds the 
appearance and interaction of structures in our own universe. 
In other words, the rules we choose determine different types of universe: 
monotonous, periodic, chaotic, or those capable of generating complex structures which 
evolve in different ways. 
The most famous of these complex (sometimes called fractal) automata is the so-
called «game-of-life», which we will tackle extensively in the next section. Such is the 
analogy between what happens in this automaton and the real world, that the «game-of-
life» has been used by authors such as Daniel Dennett as an illustration of how a world 
ruled by a simple and strict physics may give rise to structures strongly analogous to living 
beings which, like living beings, should be described with a language of «intentions», «risk 
avoiding», «anticipation», «open opportunities», and so forth16. 
This circumstance makes of cellular automata in general, and complex cellular 
automata of the «game-of-life» type in particular, a set of mathematical objects key for the 
study of the predictions of the mathematical multiverse. The automata provide us with 
possible worlds which sometimes contain classes of objects analogous (in complexity) to 
those in our own universe, and which gives us the opportunity to investigate what happens 
to the complexity of those worlds when the rules of these interesting automata are made 
more general and complicated. 
For instance, it is evident −at least to the degree of precision reached by our best 
instruments− that the laws and constants of nature do not experience any temporal 
variation in our world. Is this a necessary prerequisite for a universe to generate complex 
structures as ours? Or is this a case of a strange simplicity within the set of universes with 
rules that allow interesting structures to appear? That is, do we live, or not, in a typical 
universe in the set of those that generate dynamics similar to our world, as we should 
expect, according to the predictions of the mathematical universe?  
We shall try to answer this question in the next section. 
4. Cellular automata considered as universes. Experiments on the 
influence on complex structures of changes in the laws 
A cellular automaton17 (CA in short) is a set of finite deterministic automata (FDA) 
distributed in discrete cells along a regular grid. The inputs of the automata are the sets of 
states of their neighbors; the neighborhood is the same along the grid. CA can be one-
                                                 
16 See DENNETT (2003) cap.2. 
17 See NEUMANN (1966). 
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dimensional (if the grid is a string of cells), bi-dimensional (when the grid is a surface), or 
higher-dimensional. 
When the grids are finite, boundary conditions become essential. They determine, 
for instance, which is the left neighbor of the leftmost cell. A typical boundary condition is 
called periodic (or cyclic): (1-D) rows are turned into circles (their extreme cells become 
adjacent to each other); (2-D) rectangular grids into toroids (connecting the leftmost 
column to the rightmost column and the top row to the bottom row). Static (or closed) 
boundary conditions are also common, where the extreme cells are assumed to be 
connected to permanent 0-state cells. 
A given CA can be tested (executed) with different initial conditions: the initial 
states of all the cells in the grid. 
4.1 Experiments with one-dimensional cellular automata 
A one-dimensional CA is a linear string of cells, each containing an FDA. Each 
automaton in the string has the same set of n possible states; a set of neighbors, defined by 
the number (k) of neighboring cells to its left and to its right, which is the same for all the 
FDA; and a transition function (called the rule of the CA, also the same for all), which 
defines the next state of each automaton in the string as a function of its own current state 
and the states of its neighbors.  
In our experiments, we have worked with one-dimensional CA with the following 
properties:  
• Number of states: n=2, represented by 0 and 1. Usually state 0 will be called «dead» 
and state 1 will be called «alive». 
• Maximum distance of neighbors: k=2, which means that the number of neighbors 
for each cell is 4 (two to the left and two to the right). 
• Therefore, the next state of each cell is a function of five binary variables (the state 
of the cell itself and its four neighbors). The number of different possible rules is 
thus 232. A given rule can be defined by a 32 bit binary string such as the following: 
01001011010010110100101101001011, where each bit defines the next state of 
each cell for all the possible values of the five input variables in the natural order. 
• An additional restriction will be imposed on the rules, to prevent spontaneous 
generation: when the current state of a cell is «dead» and the states of all its 
neighbours are «dead», the next state of the cell must be «dead». This means that 
the rule of the CA must always start by 0, and the number of possible rules 
becomes 231. 
• For our tests, we have selected a CA grid with cyclic boundary conditions. 
Stephen Wolfram classified18 one-dimensional CA into four broad categories: (i) 
Class 1: ordered behavior; (ii) Class 2: periodic behavior; (iii) Class 3: random or chaotic 
behavior; (iv) Class 4: complex behavior. The first two are totally predictable. Random CA 
are unpredictable. Somewhere in between, in the transition from periodic to chaotic, a 
complex, interesting behavior can occur.  
                                                 
18 See WOLFRAM (2002). 
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Chris Langton discovered19 that there is a relation between the λ (lambda) value of a 
set of rules and the Wolfram classification. He quantified the classification scheme by 
introducing parameter λ, and hypothesized that CA's computational capability is related to 
their average dynamical behavior, which λ is claimed to predict. For binary-state (1-D) CA, 
the Lambda parameter is the probability that a given neighborhood (chosen among all the 
possible configurations) leads to a «living» state, and is equal to the fraction of 1's in the 
rule. CA produce ordered behavior when values of lambda are close to zero or one, and 
chaotic behavior somewhere in between.  As λ reaches a critical value (λc, the edge of 
chaos), rules tend to exhibit long-lived, complex behavior. 
Since the total number of rules is too large to allow for a systematic study, we have 
selected at random four automata with rules which generate a complex behavior, and 
explored what happens when one or two mutations are applied to these rules. Tables 1 and 
2 show the results. The Complex/Chaotic corresponds to the case when the modified CA 
displays a complex behavior for some initial conditions, and a chaotic behavior for other. 
Table 1. What happens when all possible single mutations are applied to a CA with 
complex behavior. 
Rule Complex Chaotic Complex
/Chaotic 
Ordered/
Periodic 
Total 
0100101101001011
0100101101001011 
21 1 0 9 31 
0101011001101110
1110111010000000 
9 20 2 0 31 
0110011001100110
0110011001100110 
9 14 3 5 31 
0011110000111100
0011110000111100 
10 12 2 7 31 
Table 2. What happens when all possible consecutive double mutations are applied 
to a CA with complex behavior. 
Rule Complex Chaotic Complex
/Chaotic 
Ordered
/Periodic 
Total 
0100101101001011
0100101101001011 
14 3 2 11 30 
0101011001101110
1110111010000000 
3 26 1 0 30 
0110011001100110
0110011001100110 
0 17 8 5 30 
0011110000111100
0011110000111100 
5 12 1 12 30 
                                                 
19 See LANGTON (1990). 
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These tables show that the behavior of the automata changes from complex to 
ordered, periodic, or, most frequently, chaotic, when its rule (i.e. one of the laws of nature 
for a world regulated by its rule) is modified; but in a significant number of cases, the 
automaton maintains a complex behavior after the change. 
The next tests were performed on the second CA in tables 1 and 2. This CA has 
been designed with a rule similar to the laws of our universe, according to the following 
considerations: 
1. The rule is symmetric, i.e. the neighbors to the left have the same effect as the 
neighbors to the right. 
2. Too few neighbors or too many neighbors tend to cause the «death» of the central 
cell (as in the Game of Life). 
3. About one half situations cause cells to become «alive», the other half make them 
«dead». According to Langton, this makes complex behavior more probable. 
As indicated in the tables, the rule for this automaton is the following: 
01010110011011101110111010000000. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the evolution of this CA 
for three different initial conditions. In these figures and the following ones, time is the 
vertical axis, «dead» cells are shown in white, and «living» cells in black. 
 
Figure 1: Complex behaviour of the CA with symmetric rule 
01010110011011101110111010000000 with initial conditions (300x0),1,(300x0). 
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Figure 2: Complex behaviour of the CA in Figure 1 with initial conditions 1100 
repeated to make a 601 long string. 
 
Figure 3: Complex behaviour of the CA in figure 1 with initial conditions 
(299x0)111(299x0) 
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If the rule of this CA is applied a single mutation, symmetry is lost, and the 
complex behavior for these initial conditions becomes chaotic (see fig. 4-6). 
 
Figure 4: Chaotic behaviour of the CA with asymmetric rule 
01010110001011101110111010000000 with initial conditions (300x0),1,(300x0). 
 
Figure 5: Chaotic behaviour of the CA in Figure 4 with initial conditions 1100 
repeated to make a 601 long string. 
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Figure 6: Chaotic behaviour of the CA in Figure 4 with initial conditions 
(299x0),111,(299x0). 
However, if we apply a double mutation which maintains symmetry, the behavior 
of the CA will still be complex (see figures 7-9). 
 
Figure 7: Complex behaviour of the CA with symmetric rule 
01010110000011101110111010000000 with initial conditions (300x0),1,(300x0). 
 17
 
Figure 8: Complex behaviour of the CA in Figure 7 with initial conditions 1100 
repeated to make a 601 long string. 
 
Figure 9: Complex behaviour of the CA in Figure 7 with initial conditions 
(299x0),111,(299x0). 
The same happens with other double mutations which also keep the symmetry. 
We next complicated even more the «laws of nature» in this universe, applying the 
original rule for some time during the evolution of the CA, then applying a double 
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mutation for some time, and letting the CA go back to its original rule. In general, we got a 
complex behavior, even though the evolution in each case is visibly different from the 
corresponding histories of the original CA (those shown in figures 1-3). Figures 10-13 
show the results. 
 
Figure 10: Complex behaviour of the CA with symmetric rule 
01010110011011101110111010000000 with initial conditions (300x0),1,(300x0) during 
generations 250-750. 
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Figure 11: Complex behaviour of the CA in figure 10 with double mutation 
RULES[10 19]←0 applied in generation 500 and undone in generation 600.  
 
Figure 12: Complex behaviour of the CA in figure 10 with double mutation 
RULES[10 19]←0 applied in generation 500 and undone in generation 510. 
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Figure 13: Complex behaviour of the CA in figure 10 with double mutation 
RULES[10 19]←0 applied in generation 500 and undone in generation 501. 
 
 
Figure 14. A run of the original cellular automaton with double mutation applied 
randomly at every step. 
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Figure 15. Another run of the original cellular automaton with double mutation 
applied randomly at every step 
Finally, the double mutation RULES[10 19]←0 was applied in every generation 
with a probability of 1 in 1000. Figures 14-15 show two different runs of this process. 
These experiments show that the CA-universes which exhibit an interesting behavior (i.e. a 
complex behavior) do not lose it automatically if they suffer certain changes in their rules. 
This suggests that the most general form of the laws of nature allows for a certain time 
variability in those laws.  
In any case, as shown by the above figures, the actual histories of the modified 
universes will be different. Also, from so a general perspective, we cannot say what will 
happen to a given structure in a complex world when its laws are complicated with changes 
of any type (for instance, by introducing temporal changes in the laws, as shown in the 
experiments). 
But we can certainly expect at least that many variations of such universes will allow 
the existence of entities of analogous complexity. 
4.2 Experiments with bi-dimensional cellular automata 
To study what happens to particular structures in a complex world when changes in 
the laws occur, we decided to analyze bi-dimensional automata of the Game-of-Life type20, 
one of the best explored up-to-now. 
                                                 
20 See WOLFRAM (1986). 
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So far, CA have proved very powerful to simulate many real life applications and 
phenomena. It has also been proved that some 1-D and 2-D CA, such as the Game-of-Life 
(Life, in short), are computationally equivalent to the Universal Turing Machine21. 
The 2-D CA called the Game-of-Life was designed by John Conway. It consists of 
a matrix of cells, where each cell may take one of two states: alive and dead (respectively 
represented by one and zero). Each cell has eight neighbors, according to the Moore 
neighborhood (in the eight main directions of the compass). At every time step, also called 
a generation, each cell computes its new state by determining the states of the cells in its 
neighborhood and applying the transition rules to compute its new state. Every cell uses 
the same update rules, and all the cells are updated simultaneously. The next state of a cell 
is determined by the rule B3/S23, which means that cells are born (go from the dead to the 
living state) if they have exactly three living neighbors, and survive if they have two or three 
living neighbors. In all other cases, a cell dies or remains dead. 
Different variants of the game of life have been defined. HighLife, for instance, 
differs because its rule is B36/S23 (i.e. a cell is also born if it has 6 living neighbors). Life-3-
4 has the rule B34/S34 (cells are born or survive if they have 3 or 4 living neighbors). Seeds 
is a CA with the rule B2/S (a cell is born if it has exactly two living neighbors, but it never 
survives). 
Formally, a cellular automaton (CA) «universe» of this type consists of two things:  
• The CA definition, consisting of: 
o A set of states, in our case restricted to {0,1} 
o A space dimension, in our case 2 
o A space size, in our case 60x60 
o The space boundary condition, in our case a flat toroid 
o A neighborhood, in our case the Moore neighborhood 
o The CA rule, which describes the way in which the initial conditions will 
change with time. The rule may be selected from a large set of possible 
rules: Life, HighLife, 3-4-Life or Seeds, among others. Mixed rules will also 
be used in some cases. For instance, the Life rule up to generation 25; the 
HighLife rule up to generation 50; and so on, periodically. Other mixed 
cases will also be considered. 
• The initial condition: a matrix of initial states (in our case 60x60) with values in the 
set of states (in our case {0,1}). 
In our experiments, we first select a given CA definition (i.e. a rule, since all the 
other parameters of the CA are fixed). We have developed a genetic evolution program 
                                                 
21 See SARKAR (2000). 
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which selects some of the most «interesting» initial conditions for that CA definition: those 
which give rise to a good number of interesting small CA structures, specially gliders 
(which make it possible to design logical gates, and thus provide Life with the capability of 
universal computation), but also r-pentominos, or exploders.  
The genetic evolution program has the following additional parameters22:  
• Population size: 64 random initial conditions for the CA whose rules have been 
chosen. 
• Size of the original population random initial conditions: 30x30 centered on the 
60x60 universe. The remainder of the CA space is set at state 0 (dead cells). 
• Number of evolutionary steps: 400 
• The fitness score for each member of the population is the number of appearances 
of «interesting» structures during generations 40 to 54 during the execution of the 
CA.  
• Population replacement after each step: the 16 individuals with least scores are 
replaced by another 16, obtained from the 16 with the highest scores (which are 
paired randomly) by means of sexual reproduction, which uses the genetic 
operations of genetic recombination and random mutations to generate new 
genomes.  
• After the indicated number of generations, the program returns that universe which 
obtained the maximum score in the whole process  (the best initial conditions for 
the chosen CA rule). This CA is analyzed using the Golly application, unloaded 
from http://golly.sourceforge.net/ to find all the interesting structures it generates. 
Table 3 shows the results obtained in our experiments, seven for each type of rule 
(Life, HighLife, and a periodic mixed Life/HighLife rule, as described above), selecting for 
both gliders and r-pentominos. For comparison, row 4 in this table shows what happened 
when the evolutionary algorithm was changed to select for a different type of object (two 
simple types of exploders). Five experiments of the latter type were performed. 
Table 3. Summary of experiments as a function of rule type  
Type of rules Average life 
length 
Gliders R-Pent. Exploders 
Life 578 106(32.78+4x∞) 22 many 
HighLife 386 33(57.9) 2 24 
L→HL→L→... 552 59(57+4x∞) 13 40 
Life  
(exploders selected) 
938 79(24.04+∞) 26 88 
 
                                                 
22 See more technical details of this program and the related experiments in our paper: ALFONSECA, M. and 
Soler Gil, F. J. (forthcoming), «Evolving interesting initial conditions for cellular automata of the Game-of-
Life type». 
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A few conclusions derived from Table 3:  
• Interesting behavior appears both with Life, Highlife and the mixed rule. The 
highest score corresponds to one experiment which used Life, and the highest 
number of gliders appeared in another experiment also using Life, but the second 
and fourth highest on both accounts (respectively) was reached by one experiment 
which used HighLife. Sometimes, however, for all rules, the evolution experiment 
does not generate much interesting behavior. This happened in 6 out of 7 HighLife 
experiments, 4 out of 7 mixed experiments, and 3 out of 7 Life experiments, which 
seems to indicate that the rules of Life are somewhat more prone to the appearance 
of «interesting» behavior than the rules of Highlife, while the mixed rules occupy an 
intermediate position. 
• The life length of an experiment is considered to end when the CA configuration 
goes into a static situation, where the states of all the cells remain the same forever 
(not necessarily dead), or a periodic configuration, where the states of the cells 
oscillate with a certain period. 
• Gliders are generated much more frequently than r-pentominos. Their column in 
Table 3 shows two numbers: the first is the total number of different gliders 
generated by the CA with the evolved initial conditions for all the experiments 
associated to a given rule; the second provides the average life of the gliders (the 
average number of generations that they endured, computed as the sum of the 
number of generations that each glider exists divided by the number of gliders, 
excluding permanent gliders, if any). In some experiments, two gliders collided and 
destroyed one another. In many cases, a glider is generated and destroyed almost 
immediately. In some cases, one or more gliders survived permanently, giving rise 
to a final periodic configuration with a period of 240 generations23. 
• When exploders were not selected for, they appear anyway, relatively frequently. 
Sometimes they are quite complex (see figure 16, which also displays a glider). 
Similarly, when exploders are selected for, rather than gliders and r-pentominos, the 
latter appear anyway. It is interesting to notice that the average number of gliders 
per experiment (15.8) and their duration (24.04) are similar to those obtained when 
gliders are directly selected using the game of Life rules (15.14 / 32.78), while three 
times less gliders (4.7), but with longer duration (57.9), appeared when gliders were 
selected with the HighLife rules. On the other hand, the experiments where 
exploders are selected had a higher average life length (about double that of the 
previous experiments). 
                                                 
23 It takes a glider 4 generations to move a position diagonally. So, in an universe of size 60x60, the period of 
a permanent glider will always be 240. 
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Figure 16. An exploder at generation 239 in experiment AA8B. A glider is also 
visible. 
In the next set of experiments, we have tried to find out the effect of changing the 
rules, but maintaining the initial conditions developed in the previous set of experiments. 
In this way, we used the initial conditions evolved for Life with the HighLife rules and vice 
versa.  The results are shown at rows 3 and 4 in table 4. For comparison, rows 1, 2 and 9 
show the average results for the CA summarized in Table 3. It can be seen that, when the 
rules for HighLife are used with the initial conditions for Life, the results are «less 
interesting» (shorter life length, and very few gliders and similar objects appear). In the 
opposite case, however, the situation is not so clear: we get a longer life length, but a 
similar (even slightly larger) number of objects. Again, as in previous experiments, the 
HighLife rules are seen to be somewhat less versatile than the Life rules. 
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Table 4. Summary of experiments when initial conditions evolved for Life are used 
with the HighLfe rules and vice versa  
Rules evolved for A, used 
with B 
Average life 
length 
Gliders 
per exper. 
R-Pent. 
per exper. 
Exploders 
per exper. 
Life / Life 578 15.1 3.1 many 
HighLife / HighLife 386 4.7 0.3 3.4 
Life / HighLife 170 1.1 0.6 2.4 
HighLife / Life 961 20.3 5.3 8.9 
Life / Life→HighLife 394 5.3 1.6 2.3 
HighLife / HighLife→Life 1827 >16.7 2.9 many 
Life / L→HL→L 791 14.4 3.9 5.9 
Life / L→HL→L→... 478 9 2 4.1 
L→HL→L→... / 
L→HL→L→... 
552 8.4 1.9 5.7 
 
The next set of experiments tried to find the effect of changing the rules during the 
execution of one of the automata generated in the previous examples. In this case, the 
initial conditions evolved for one type of laws (Life or HighLife) were applied to a CA 
which runs under those laws until generation 46, then changes to the opposite laws during 
the remainder of its «life». Thus, if the automaton was generated using the rules of Life, at 
generation 46 the rules would be changed to HighLife, and vice versa. The results can be 
seen at rows 5 and 6 in Table 4. From their observation we may get the following 
conclusions: 
• The mixed rule of the form Life→HighLife (with initial conditions evolved for 
Life) generated a less complex behavior (shortest life, less gliders and other 
interesting objects) than the equivalent experiments where the rules of Life were 
allowed to apply always, but a slightly more complex behavior than those where the 
rules of HighLife applied always, with initial conditions evolved for HighLife, and 
significantly more complex than those where the rules of HighLife were applied 
with initial conditions evolved for Life. 
• The mixed rule of the form HighLife→Life (with initial conditions evolved for 
HighLife) generated a behavior at least as complex (in fact slightly more complex) 
than those where initial conditions evolved for Life were applied to a CA running 
with the Life rules. 
In the next set of experiments of this type, we started with CA with rules of the 
Life type and let it develop for 46 generations; then changed the rules to HighLife, 
executed them for 4 generations, and restored again the rules to Life for the remainder of 
their development. The initial conditions evolved for CA with Life rules where applied to 
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these CA. Row 7 in table 4 show the results: a CA of this type performs comparably as that 
with the Life rule.  
In the next set of experiments, we started with CA with rules of the Life type and 
let it develop for 46 generations; then changed the rules to HighLife, executed them for 4 
generations, and restored again the rules to Life. This procedure was repeated periodically 
every 50 generations. The initial conditions evolved for CA with Life rules where applied to 
these CA. Row 8 in table 4 show the results: a CA of this type performs slightly worse than 
that with the Life rule, but about the same as the CA with periodic rules and initial 
conditions evolved for them (row 9 in the table). 
To end this analysis, we decided to perform a few experiments using completely 
different types of cellular automata: 
• The first we tried was Life-3-4, defined by the rule B34/S34. It resulted not to be 
amenable to this kind of experiments: there are no small long-lived structures 
similar to gliders, and therefore evolutionary algorithms do not seem to work; they 
fail to improve the best score, which is typically reached randomly in the first 
generation at a very low value, and remains there for the remainder of the 
evolutionary process.  
• Then we tried Seeds, a CA defined by the rule B2/S. With this apparently radical 
rule, however, it is possible to generate structures similar to gliders which move one 
step in a certain direction from one generation to the next. We selected for this 
structure in our evolutionary process. This CA has the problem that the number of 
cells alive increases quickly (in our experiments this happened always before the 
100th «generation»), finally covering about 20% of the available space, and their 
distribution is more or less chaotic, which produces the effect that any glider that 
may appear from this point on will be quickly smothered by the neighboring cells 
and will stay there for just one or two generations. This chaotic behavior seems to 
stay forever, which means that the CA never reaches a static or periodic situation. 
To reduce this effect, we restricted the «life» of the CA to the first 60 generations 
and counted the number of gliders which appeared, and their duration. In the two 
experiments performed, 6 and 7 gliders were produced (respectively) with an 
average duration of 11.4 generations. 
• Finally we tried the following mixed case: we started with CA of the Life or the 
HighLife type, and let them develop for 46 generations; then we changed the rules 
to 3-4-Life, executed them for 4 generations, and restored the rules to Life or 
HighLife. Table 5 shows the results. In some cases, the automata could not recover 
their former complexity after the change: not a single glider was produced after the 
original rule was restored. In other cases, however, new gliders were generated. We 
can conclude that even this drastic change in the rules decreases only moderately 
the average complexity of the development, i.e. sometimes the complexity of a 
given experiment is destroyed, but in other cases the CA is able to recover and 
proceeds to generate new complex behavior for a reasonable number of 
generations. 
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Table 5. Experiments with Life/3-4-Life mixed rules  
Rules evolved for A, used 
with B 
Life 
length 
Gliders R-Pent. Exploders 
Life /  
Life→Life-3-4→Life 
341 9.6 3.9 3.4 
HighLife /  
HighLife→Life-3-4→HighLife 
260 5.6 2.3 4 
Life / Life 578 15.1 3.1 many 
HighLife / HighLife 386 4.7 0.3 3.4 
 
Our conclusion: CA with mixed (time-dependent) rules are fully as capable to 
generate interesting behavior as those with «pure» rules, in some cases even more so. 
 
4.3 Additional experiments with bi-dimensional cellular automata 
It has been mentioned before (in the preceding sub-section) that a combination of 
gliders and glider generators and destroyers makes it possible to design logical gates, and 
thus provide Life with the capability of universal computation. Since any possible 
computation can be built (in principle) as a combination of just three types of possible 
gates (OR, AND and NOT), with a large enough grid, any possible computation can be 
performed by the game of Life. 
We have tested the structures that perform the three logical gates in Life, and have 
found out that all of them are compatible and stable with four different cellular automata 
rules:  
• Life: B3/S23 
• B38/S23 
• B3/S238 
• B38/S238 
Therefore, these four types of cellular automata are computationally complete. 
What is more, any temporal combination of those four automata will also be 
computationally complete and all computational structures which can be built will be stable 
and functional in them. We have confirmed this by testing just two periodic situations 
where the rules for  Life and B38/S23 on the one hand, and Life and B38/S238 on the 
other, alternate every 50 generations. Therefore we have found an infinite set of cellular 
automata rules (4 basic ones, with a constant rule, and an infinity of time-dependent 
combinations) all of which are capable of universal computation (in our parlance, 
compatible with life). In this case, the probability of finding one cellular automaton in this 
family with constant rules is mathematically equal to zero (4 divided by infinity). 
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5. Discussion of the results 
In this paper, we have checked on the fact that the only version of the multiverse 
that could be a suitable candidate for explaining the fine tuning of the laws of our universe 
to make the existence of complex entities in general and of intelligent beings in particular 
possible is Tegmark's mathematical multiverse. Then we have focused on the question 
whether the peculiar laws of our universe can be explained from the hypothesis that ours is 
a typical «complex-universe» or «life-enabling universe» among the set of all the worlds 
which includes all the consistent mathematical structures. 
In order for this to be the case, the laws of our universe should be the most general 
among those consistent with our existence. To test this, in the previous section we have 
analyzed and proved that the most general form of those complex universes (which must 
exist, according to Tegmark's hypothesis) whose structure corresponds to that of cellular 
automata, are those whose rules exhibit some kind of temporal variability. 
If this result can be extrapolated −and we should not forget that there are 
numerous authors from Martin Gardner to Daniel Dennett who have suggested the 
existence of a very close relation between the «game of life» and our universe−, it would 
imply that our universe is not typical at all, since it attains a high degree of complexity with 
laws and physical constants specially simple, as they are not a function of time. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that the number of possible universes compatible with life which 
would exhibit some kind of temporal dependence in their laws and physical constants, 
while keeping within the allowable margins of values, must be infinitely more probable 
than those of our type, which means that the probability of our existence in a world such as 
ours would be mathematically equal to zero. 
In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling 
that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate 
explanation to the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. Multiverses are either too 
small or too large to explain fine-tuning. All the multiverses which have been proposed, 
except the «mathematical multiverse», are too small, so that they merely shift the problem 
of fine tuning up one level. But the «mathematical multiverse» is too large, in the sense that, 
in its context, the simplicity of our world becomes inexplicable. 
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